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immortality, they *should* not have been so unless the evidence was conclusive. The advantage of having certainty, where not justifiable, is only the advantage of blindness. We think we see what we do not, and it may be an advantage to fall over a cliff under the impression that we see solid earth where there is nothing. I do not know. Some, however, prefer to know the worst before they come upon it.

I have attempted to show, then, that religious knowledge is not different in kind from scientific knowledge, but that it is scientific or philosophical knowledge (1) systematized and (2) poetically expressed. And I have further pointed out that the dogmatic certainty derived equally from all articles of the ancient creed cannot be found in any form of modern knowledge. If we are still to speak of religious knowledge, that element in its older form must be omitted, and its place is supplied by the courage which dares to acknowledge ignorance.

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## ETHICS AS A SCIENCE.

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MOST young men who were students in an American college before the last third of the nineteenth century can recall that the terms *ethics* and *psychology* were not often used as titles of text-books. The subjects now dealt with under these heads were known as Mental and Moral Science. Among the most popular manuals were Francis Wayland's "Elements of Moral Science," which first appeared in 1835, and his "Elements of Intellectual Philosophy," published about twenty years later. The same may be said of Noah Porter's "Human Intellect," published in 1868, and of his "Elements of Moral Science," which was given to the public in 1868. The term

'psychology' is not in Johnson's dictionary issued in Philadelphia in 1819, although this edition is probably a reprint of that of 1773. Dr. Campbell, in his "Philosophy of Rhetoric," says: "Under the general term (physiology) I also comprehend natural theology and psychology, which, in my opinion, have been most unnaturally disjoined by philosophers." Here we see that psychology is not yet recognized as a distinct branch of knowledge. Sir William Hamilton says, in his lectures, that "Psychology, or the Philosophy of the Human Mind, strictly so denominated, is the science conversant about the phenomena, or modifications, or States of the Mind, or Conscious-Subject, or Soul, or Spirit, or Ego." When we speak of mental or moral science, it is not necessary to define the subject, or to vindicate for it admission to the hierarchy of the sciences: that is a postulate. We are here, however, chiefly concerned with moral science, and purpose to examine its claim to an equal rank with any other science, except mathematics. There are so many definitions of 'science' that everybody may be assumed to be familiar with one or more of them. It can be said that every department of human knowledge may be made *a* science if its data and phenomena are capable of being coördinated and their relation to one another formulated as cause and effect. Some sciences are mainly retrospective; others chiefly prospective; others, again, are both. Geology, for example, is almost wholly a retrospective science because its phenomena took place mainly in the past. So far as we have the means of knowing, changes like those that have occurred in bygone ages will never recur, or at least not in conceivable time. On the other hand, the mental and moral sciences, if it be permissible to separate them, will be more and more developed as the laws of the human psyche are better understood. Feeble beginnings were made by the Greek thinkers, but after them no progress was made for more than two millenniums.

It is proposed here to examine what claims ethics has

to be regarded as a science and to note some of the facts and data with which it has to operate. Incidentally, it will appear whether the term *moral science* is founded in the nature of the human mind. During the present century, the intimate connection between morals and science has been insisted on by M. Lévy-Bruhl in his "Ethics and Moral Science," and by the late Gustav Ratzenhofer in his illuminating work "Positive Ethik." Says the former on the last page of Elizabeth Lee's translation: "Thus we must always come back to the idea of knowledge which frees. But do not let us imagine that the enfranchisement is produced of itself, nor that a sort of beneficent necessity assures in advance the progress of the sciences. The spectacle afforded by the history of humanity is quite different: we see scarcely anything except societies arrested in their development, stagnating or perishing or subject to conditions which have not permitted a decisive progression in the positive knowledge of nature. Greece alone was a striking exception, and we still live by her spirit. However, we shall only truly live by it if it is active in us, that is, if we pursue the methodical conquest of the whole of the real by science."

It is not easy to see how anyone can deny the existence of innate ethical ideas. Of course, in their beginnings they are feeble, and their development proceeds by an evolutionary force. But how can they be developed if they do not exist in embryo? Even those anthropologists who maintain the existence of moral germs in the lower animals do not affirm that they can be developed or strengthened. If they exist at all, they are the same in each successive generation. Nor do the germs exist in any of the lower animals except in those that have been associated with man. There is no progress from generation. On the contrary, in every community of men, no matter how low they may stand on the inclined plane of progress, there are at least a few who recognize the binding force of an obligation under favorable conditions. Many persons are familiar with the story of the two

natives of 'darkest Africa' who transported David Livingstone's dead body more than a thousand miles to the coast, in spite of almost insuperable difficulties, in fulfillment of a promise made to their master while he was yet alive. Assuming that they expected a reward, it could mean little to men living in such a primitive condition. It is well known that the influence of Europeans upon natives is everywhere paramount so long as they keep their word and deal justly with them. Unfortunately, such has not always been the case. It has often been said that no Quaker was ever killed by an Indian. Yet the Indians, in general, did not put much confidence in the whites, because so many did not deserve confidence. When they proved treacherous, they merely repaid their enemies in their own coin. The well-known speech of Logan, the Mingo chief, exhibits the Red Man at his best and in no wise ethically inferior to the Pale Face. The wildest Bedawee will fight to the death to protect the guest to whom he has pledged his word. The man who keeps faith acts scientifically because he acts truthfully.

The earliest Hebrew prophets were as vehement preachers of righteousness as the later. So strong was their conviction that justice will prevail in the end that they proclaimed this truth often at the risk of their lives. Hosea declares: "I desire mercy and not sacrifice, and the knowledge of God more than burnt offerings." "Who is wise, and he shall understand these things? prudent and he shall know them? for the ways of the Lord are right and the just shall walk in them; but transgressors shall fall in them." Readers of Froude's notable essay on the Book of Job must have been deeply impressed with the high moral sentiments expressed by this non-Israelite patriarch, if the Book itself did not appeal strongly to them. Hosea's older contemporary, Amos the shepherd, is equally vehement in his denunciation of vice and wrong-doing. He is firmly convinced that God is not appeased or conciliated by ceremonies. He will help only those whose conduct is right and whose

actions are just. The prophets do not argue. They are not all clear as to the source of their convictions. But they have a very strong instinctive feeling, an intuition, that the prosperity of a people depends upon their observance of the moral law. They are like the child that knows lying and stealing to be wrong, yet is unable to tell why, unless it be that they are forbidden by God. These prophets may have been no more than the center of a coterie of men whose convictions coincided with their own. But they had a profound spiritual insight, an intuition, the correctness of which was confirmed by their limited experience.

We find similar sentiments in Hesiod's "Works and Days," which is a sort of compendium of practical morality. The poet of Askra was the victim of personal wrongs, it is true, but the justness of his conclusions is not invalidated by this fact. Rural life is more conducive to reflection than the city with its bustle and hurry. The shepherd and the tiller of the soil cannot hasten the growth of the crops, and only to a limited extent has he the power to increase his flocks. His condition is different from that of the merchant and the tradesman who gains with almost every transaction; if he loses in one, he expects to recoup himself in the next. We need not wonder that posterity came in time to take the prophets at their word and to accept their vaticinations as inspired. Their ethical tone was far above the practice of mankind. Under a rigid monotheism, God alone could be the source of their intuitions. I have long been of the opinion that the divine voice which Socrates was wont to hear was exactly the same voice which prompted the Hebrew prophets. But under a polytheistic system, such a voice could not be other than that of a special divinity. Socrates was in doubt about a matter that was perfectly clear to the Hebrew prophets. The Jews are indebted for some features of their ethical code to the Mesopotamians and the Egyptians. But it contains a good deal that is original with them. Darnes-

teter is probably right in assigning to his correlative the two leading ideas of modern times: that of the unity of all forces and that of interminable progress. The first of these was dimly discerned by a few of the Greek thinkers; but the latter found no place in the thought of any of them. Salomon Reinach affirms with much confidence that "C'est la Bible, et non la philosophie un peu hautaine des Grecs, qui a été la première éducatrice de l'Europe, qui l'a préparée à s'imprégner d'hellénisme depuis la Renaissance et qui, en lui ouvrant perspectives plus larges, l'a peu à peu mise en état de se passer d'elle" ("Orpheus," p. 256).

It is wonderful with what persistence the Hebrew prophets proclaimed fundamental moral principles age after age. Most of their doctrines were transferred to the New Testament, but its eschatology led the Christians to lay undue stress on a preparation for the future life and to neglect the life that now is. It is true that their position in the Roman empire, for a long time, afforded them few opportunities for influencing the course of events. Nevertheless, for centuries after the conversion of Constantine, many Christians looked for a millennial era, a transformation of all things to be brought about suddenly and miraculously. The doctrine of the second advent of Christ still has a large number of adherents. It is a logical corollary to the belief in a righteous God as the avenger of unrighteousness among men. Conversely, the Jews of the Diaspora clung to this faith with the greater tenacity, after they had ceased to believe in the coming of a visible Messiah who should establish an earthly kingdom. This intuitive belief is very mysterious and was certainly not apprehended scientifically. Eventually, however, both Jews and Christians came to perceive that the kingdom of righteousness must be established by scientific means, and that the process is slow and difficult. The dignity of man, the solidarity of the human race, love to one's neighbor, the equality of men before God, are as much postulates of

Judaism as of Christianity. It is worth noting, in this connection, that some of the most eminent living anthropologists believe in the unity of the human race, a doctrine proclaimed by Saint Paul on Mars Hill, and which must have seemed rank foolishness to the Greeks among his auditors. In like manner, the division of the various languages of the earth into three or four unconnected branches is no longer held to be scientific by many philologists. The doctrine that one Jew is as good as another seems to have prevailed pretty generally among them before the Christian era, and as despicable as another, in the eyes of the Gentiles. It has long been an axiom among them, but only a theory among Christians. Roman Catholics do not, officially at least, regard Protestants as Christians.

The scientific or rational State, in other words, the State as conceived by modern political philosophers, differs radically from all that existed in antiquity, and from most of those that existed until comparatively recent times. The modern State functions as if it were destined to be perpetual. The Egyptian pyramids, the Babylonian palaces, the Greek and Roman temples, served an individual or a religious purpose. They had no interest for the average citizen except perhaps a sentimental one. Rome was to some extent an exception. Some of its material structures benefited the public. But this benefit was incidental; their primary object was to serve the government, which was far less of and for the whole people than most of those of recent date. It existed for and was conducted by the optimates. Every reader of ancient history knows that the *Kultur* of the Mesopotamians, the Egyptians, the Cretans, and even of the Canaanites, was far more advanced than that of the Israelites long after they undertook the conquest of Palestine. But so far as we have information, no moral reformers arose among any of these peoples. Even if there were not more than two or three preachers of righteousness among the Jews in a century, a con-



siderable portion of the people must have listened to them and treasured up their sayings. For several centuries the prophetic voices were never wholly silent. The author of the twenty-ninth chapter of Proverbs recognizes their value when he writes: "Where there is no vision, the people cast off restraint;" or, as Luther translates more accurately: "*Wo keine Weissagung ist.*" The late Professor James evidently had something of this kind in his thought when he said, in his first Manchester College lecture: "One may be true without being a philosopher, true by guesswork or by revelation. What distinguishes a philosopher's truth is that it is *reasoned*. Argument, not supposition, must have put it in his possession." The prophets were not merely foretellers of future events; they were also exhorters to right living and denouncers of wickedness. In the Bible, prophecy means a good deal more than prediction. It is no wonder that modern writers light here upon an enigma which they find hard to solve. The case is without parallel, and history does not illuminate it by analogies, which are often valuable in enabling us to comprehend conditions at some particular epoch. But there was no organized activity and, therefore, no perceptible betterment. Society could not pass beyond a certain point and probably advanced little, if at all, until the rise of modern science. In order to restore a patient to health, it is not enough to know what ails him, or even to know a remedy that will effect a cure. He must also be willing to apply it. It is interesting to note, in this connection, that in Henri Bergson's philosophy, intuition alone can interpret the real life-impulse. He insists that "the *whole* of the life-process eludes the scientists: that the limitations of science are fixed by the limitations of the intellect: that the life-process as an entirety transcends and escapes our reason, both in theory and in practice, and compels us to make room for Intuition, which gets closer to life itself and to the secret of life." To many this may seem a backward step. But it is not; it is

merely a return to fundamental principles, to universally accepted moral maxims. Life as a whole and in its widest acceptation must be governed by moral principles if it is to yield all that it is competent to yield. The more we have learned about the operation of evolutionary forces in the past, both of those that are beneficial and of those that are destructive, the more we have been able to promote the former and to restrain the latter. The diseases of civilization are as much the product of evolution as the remedies against them. Many instinctive processes have become conscious. But even processes more or less conscious may be harmful, and it is the scientist alone who is in position to discriminate wisely. Enthusiasm may accomplish a great deal, but unless it can eventually be guided by reason, its work is neither permanent nor continuously progressive. The rise and spread of Mohammedanism are striking examples of the truth of this assertion.

With the organization of Christian communities, there was begun a regular system of moral instruction, and various means were employed to induce converts to lead moral lives on the principles laid down in the Sacred Writings. This instruction was continued by the minor clergy through the Middle Age; it is still carried on by the same class in some of the countries where the Romish church has been deprived of all political power. Very different was the course of the higher clergy, as is well known, especially after the rise of the Jesuits. In the Mysteries, Miracle Plays, and Moralities, virtue is generally rewarded and vice punished. This must have had an influence on the masses, few of whom could read. In the early years of the eighteenth century, a class of periodicals like the *Spectator* came into existence, in which the vices and follies and foibles of men are mildly ridiculed or satirized. Nearly two hundred publications of this kind appeared in Germany and Switzerland alone, in less than so many years. In Grimm's "Märchen," unsophisticated, intuitive goodness is generally trium-

phant over the best laid schemes of vice. Most of the dissenting sects that arose after the outbreak of the religious revolution in the sixteenth century attached more importance to a moral life than the established churches, whether Catholic or Protestant. Calvinism, however, took strong ground against every form of carnal gratification, even when of the sort now regarded as morally innocuous.

Yet, in spite of these agencies, poverty and the immorality that usually goes with it continued to be the most perplexing problem with which governments had to deal. The failure was almost wholly due to the unscientific measures adopted for repressing or preventing them. We see herein the persistent and always futile effort to cure symptoms without removing the cause of the disease. How thoroughly our era is pervaded by the scientific spirit is strikingly exemplified in the most recent organization for combating vice,—the Salvation Army. Science has been called to the aid of men's moral instincts. Almost every government, and almost every intra-governmental organization, has learned to deal with poverty and crime by methods that were hardly dreamed of by the community at large a century ago. Penology has been raised to the rank of a science. It no longer operates with punishments alone or even chiefly, but in a much larger measure with preventives. It is far more concerned with causes than with symptoms. The domain of the penologist is being more and more circumscribed by that of the educator and the social reformer than used to be thought possible. The body politic is becoming more and more alive to the fact that it is cheaper to pay for turning the possible criminal from his evil ways than to punish him after he has started on his downward career. Social reformers have learned that moral lapses, especially those that are due to sexual passion, are caused more frequently by weakness than by wickedness. This conclusion has been arrived at by strictly inductive methods of investigation.

The course of human affairs has made the necessary experiments; scientists have collected and correlated the results. Every student of sexual morality knows that it was at a very low ebb all over Europe until far along in the nineteenth century. In fact the history of European morals is so gross that it cannot be exhaustively dealt with in English books. In every age, there were religious teachers who exhorted their converts to a better life. That they did much good will as little be denied as that their influence was limited. For ages the criminal law, based upon that of ancient Rome, was a monster of atrocity. It was framed on the assumption that, in order to discourage crime, it must be punished with death. Notwithstanding the almost daily experience that little was accomplished in this way, many men, among them not a few of the clergy, were clamorous for more executions. In England, with the growth of humanitarian sentiments, juries refused to convict for minor infractions of the law and often returned verdicts that were contrary to both law and evidence; but on the continent, where the administration of the law was in the hands of judges, amelioration was slow until after the French Revolution. In fact, trial by jury was one of the demands of the revolutionists. The story of the execution of Ravail-lac is such a chapter of horrors that one can hardly read it after a lapse of three centuries without a shudder. The abolition of slavery, the stronghold of sexual vice and the dancing-plot of cruelty, was opposed with the utmost rancor. But when humanitarian sentiments began to be supported by the experience that slavery is unprofitable, it had to go. The civil authorities were everywhere aided by the ecclesiastical powers in their harsh treatment of criminals. And by including heresy among crimes, the number of punishable offenses was greatly increased. It is a signal tribute to the triumph of intuitive or poetic justice that, three centuries after the death of Bruno by fire, his countrymen erected a monument to his memory on the place of his execution.

In those dark days, the people, harassed by the ecclesiastical as well as by the civil authorities, were constantly in a veritable earthly hell, although, to their good fortune, they were not aware of it because they knew no better. The history of witchcraft also makes a lurid episode in the general history of the world. It was science that eventually undermined the belief in demoniac possession.

Experience aided by careful observation has proved that morality, by and large, is greatly dependent upon economic conditions. When these conditions began to be studied scientifically and the results correlated in a scientific manner, their influence upon morals was demonstrated. Not all persons who are the victims of unfavorable economic conditions are immoral; but because these are by far the most numerous, the effect upon the body politic is extremely disastrous. Here, too, science has been greatly instrumental in bringing about improvements.

A striking example of the aid afforded by science in dealing with a moral problem is shown in the so-called temperance movement, which has assumed such surprising proportions in almost every Germanic country. From time immemorial there have been total abstainers, most of them actuated by religious motives. Yet the temperance propaganda made hardly any progress until it was demonstrated by science that alcohol is never a food, that it is in no case a necessity of the human organism, and that no one is ever the worse for abstaining from it. Dr. Benjamin Rush is generally believed to have been the first man to advance this doctrine on scientific grounds. But so long as it was an almost universal belief that alcohol is a benefit, it was impossible to dissuade men from its use, especially as long as and where an appetite for it existed. In European countries, but especially on the Continent, the use of alcoholic beverages is opposed almost wholly on scientific grounds. And it is only since the scientist has come to the aid of the senti-

mental prohibitionist that the cause of total abstinence has made notable progress.

In the domain of warfare, science has done much to promote morality, if the term can properly be used in such a connection. The fate of the vanquished was almost as deplorable in the eighteenth century as in the time of Saul and David, or in ancient Greece and Rome. It always meant *Væ victis*. Armies were usually made up of men who were little better than tramps: they took whatever they could lay their hands on. Often the camp followers, consisting largely of lewd women, were almost as numerous as the fighting force. There was no respect for property, nor for life, nor for female virtue. The officers who recruited the rank and file received or were promised a fixed sum per month out of which they paid their men, and these added to their wage what they could by plunder. There is much in Xenophon's "Anabasis" that reminds the reader of the military history of western Europe in the seventeenth century. Now it is recognized as a standing article in the code of all civilized nations that non-combatants must be protected and all damage to private property compounded. We hear a good deal about the ethics of war; and there is no doubt that military men have their code of honor. It is somewhat peculiar, but it embodies some genuine moral principles. The change must be attributed to science, and to nothing else. It is a noteworthy sign of the times that, when a few years ago, the editor of a popular French periodical requested his subscribers to vote for the half dozen of their most distinguished countrymen, Pasteur the scientist was placed first, and Napoleon the warrior fourth on the list.

The craving for justice is probably universal among men. It is a sort of blind groping for something that ought to be realized and is not. It finds frequent expression in the rustic poetry of Hesiod and in the aristocratic verses of Homer. When Hector has slain Patroklos, his friend Achilles sacrifices twelve young countrymen of

the victor upon the magnificent pyre which he has built for the corpse. Achilles takes the life of Hector, but by so doing seals his own doom. Kreon, in the exercise of his tyrannical power, entombs Antigone alive, but by his blind folly causes the death of his only son. Agamemnon sacrifices his own daughter to gratify personal ambition and is in turn assassinated by her mother, who, also, eventually falls into the hands of the avenger. Here we have the blood feud and the vendetta. It goes on and on until there are no more victims. Well does Schiller exclaim:

“Das eben ist der Fluch der bösen Tat,  
Dass sie fortzeugend immer Böses muss gebären.”

We find the same sentiment twice expressed by Æschylus in the “Agamemnon,” and Saxo-Grammaticus says in his story of Hamlet: “This is verily the curse of guilt that it must always bear within itself the incitement and the occasion of fresh guilt.” The justice or injustice, the right or wrong, between two combatants was never demonstrated by a duel, nor between two nations by a war. One will sue for peace when its resources are exhausted, but no nation ever sued for peace by admitting that it was in the wrong. Socrates clearly apprehended the folly of always insisting upon having the last word in a controversy when he declared that it is never wise or just or even expedient to do wrong, and that the reasons men are wont to put forward in justification of a deed which is intrinsically evil, will not hold before an impartial tribunal. Saint Paul exhorts his Roman converts not to avenge themselves, and cites a passage from Genesis in support of his contention. The writer of the Epistle to the Hebrews cites the same passage and adds a similar exhortation. It is a strange and inexplicable phenomenon that so rude a people should have recognized so fundamental a truth, one that every government on the face of the earth recognizes and validates, except in times of unusual excitement. The modern State, in

its corporate capacity, has taken the place of God in the theocratic commonwealth.

Although it is somewhat difficult for the State to carry on experiments looking toward the promotion of public morality,—in fact not many decades ago it would have been considered impossible,—a good deal has been done in the matter during the last half century. Besides, history has been making experiments, to employ a phrase of Comte's, for a much longer time. It is now regarded as an axiom that a State cannot only compel its citizens to act morally, but can also persuade them to shape their conduct by moral principles. A beginning was made in this direction by John Howard; and prison reformers generally regard him as their pioneer. His investigations, however, did more to call attention to the demoralizing influence of prison life than for its amelioration. But experiments made in recent years, both with youths and adults, have demonstrated that even the so-called incorrigibles are rarely altogether devoid of moral sense. It has been found that hardly one in fifty will break his word of honor. Hence, prisoners have been set to tilling the soil, to constructing highways, and to other outdoor employments. Until within recent years, almost everybody believed that a criminal is inherently vicious, ignoring the fact that there is no scientific definition of *criminal* possible. It is now admitted that the criminal is oftener weak than wicked, and, in the words of Socrates, more in need of enlightenment than of punishment, of protection against temptation than of incarceration after he has yielded.

Every science is built upon two principles: observation and experimentation. Observation depends upon experience, from which even brutes learn something. Men living on the lowest rung of civilization cannot help making some observations. But they almost always fail to trace effects to their causes and are continually discovering the influence of supernatural beings in the affairs of men. It seems incredible to us that the men of



Homer could be so purblind in this regard. It is probable that science in its relation to physical man owes more to Hippocrates and his school than to any other Greek thinker. (It is, doubtless, not a mere chance that Aristotle's father was a physician.) This school recorded many observations and raised medical practice to a height beyond which it passed, little if at all, for many centuries. But its progress was checked by its failure to make experiments except in a very limited way. Science only becomes worthy of the name when it enters fully upon the experimental stage. Phenomena must be artificially produced in order to make their occurrence explicable in nature. But in the case of some subjects like economics, sociology, and ethics, it is difficult to produce the desired phenomena, for the reason that the will is a constantly disturbing factor. Whether free or not, the forces that control it are too recondite for cognition. Yet, even here, men are coming to profit more and more by observation in domains that are out of the reach of experimentation.

It will be argued by some that if ethics were put upon an entirely scientific basis, it would deprive the noblest act of self-sacrifice of all merit. The question, however, should not be, in this case nor in any other, What would happen if something else were to occur? but, What is? Moreover, so far as the individual is concerned, we can rarely fathom the motive that prompts an altruistic deed. But we can study the means by which the community in every civilized land, that is, in every land governed by a written law, endeavors to constrain its citizens to act morally and unselfishly. Law-makers are not often scientists, but many of them are careful observers. We are encompassed by a veritable host of inspectors whose business it is to see to it that we live truthfully, honestly, chastely, and so on. These inspectors are in turn under the observation of other inspectors. Whether the motive that governs us in any particular case be the desire to stand well with our peers, or to yield obedience to what

is commonly called conscience, or to the efforts to conform to the demand of the categorical imperative, or to the quest for the highest good, or to what we consider the chief good, or in order to promote the greatest good of the largest number, or to submission to an unconscious transcendental will, does not concern men in the mass. They are concerned with results, not with motives, and results that can be attained only by the employment of scientific agencies such as governments alone are powerful enough to put in force and to practice. Science is dynamic; moral intuitions are kinetic. The scientist points the way; the moral reformer walks in it and induces others to follow him. The measure of mutual friendliness with which they coöperate is the measure of social and ethical progress.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> I was much gratified to find, after the above was written, in a review of Professor Nordtj's inaugural address, delivered before the University of Utrecht, in September, 1912, the assertion that the monotheism of the Israelites has thus far baffled all students of ancient history. He concedes that a sort of henotheism was developed among the higher classes in the nations bordering on Israel, such as was the case among the later Greeks; but he is convinced that it had no influence upon the common people and hardly any upon those who professed it. Professor N. affirms that as yet no parallel has been found to the belief in the unity and spirituality of God as held by the Hebrews. For them it was a psychic force of such potency that it eventually overcame all opposition. Until far along in the nineteenth century it was customary among theists to explain this force as divine inspiration or revelation. Then came a reaction, and the rationalists, who for a time occupied the stage, saw no mystery in it. Within recent years there has been a return to the earlier position; or rather, the younger men would be considered more nearly orthodox than their fathers. But the term 'inspiration,' if used at all, is given a different meaning. It is now treated as an innate faculty for discerning moral truths which it is impossible to analyze further.